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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA")' was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against
false, misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable
actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection."'2 As reported last year, the 77th
Texas Legislature enacted two sets of amendments in 2001. There are still
no reported decisions addressing these changes.
Effective September 1, 2001, DTPA section 17.46 was amended to in-
clude two new laundry list violations. Section 17.46(b)(18) now provides
that the term "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" also in-
cludes "advertising, selling, or distributing a card which purports to be a
prescription drug identification card issued under Section 19A, Article
21.07-6, Insurance Code, in accordance with rules adopted by the com-
missioner of insurance, which offers a discount on the purchase of health
care goods or services from a third party provider, and which is not evi-
dence of insurance coverage."'3 This provision contains three exceptions.
Because of the addition of this particular laundry list violation, it should
be noted that the numbering for the other violations that follow section
17.46(b)(18) has shifted slightly.
The Legislature also added section 17.46(b)(26), effective June 1, 2002.
New section 17.46(b)(26) provides that "selling, offering to sell, or ille-
gally promoting an annuity contract under Chapter 22, Acts of the 57th
Legislature, 3rd Called Session, 1962 (Article 6228a-5, Vernon's Texas
Civil Statues), with the intent that the annuity contract will be the subject
of a salary reduction agreement, as defined by that Act, if the annuity
contract is not an eligible qualified investment under that Act," consti-
tutes a deceptive trade practice.4
This Survey covers significant developments under the DTPA from Oc-
tober 1, 2001, through November 1, 2002, including noteworthy decisions
on the identification of the proper defendant, preemption and exemption
from the DTPA, as well as defenses to DTPA claims.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
In order to bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must fit into the statutory
definition of "consumer." 5 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff must
first be an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods
or services; second, those goods or services must form the basis of the
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-1.7.63 (Vernon 2002) [hereinafter DTPA].
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. Id. § 17.46(b)(18).
4. Id. § 17.46(b)(26).
5. See id. § 17.50.
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plaintiff's complaint. 6 Consumer status under the DTPA depends upon a
showing that the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles him to
relief.7 Whether a plaintiff qualifies for DTPA consumer status is a ques-
tion of law.8
In Marshall v. Kusch,9 , which arose from the discovery of anthrax on
real property, the Dallas Court of Appeals examined the issue of the
plaintiff's relationship to the transaction. Marshall acquired real prop-
erty, made numerous improvements, and then stocked it with numerous
species of exotic animals. An outbreak of anthrax killed some of the ani-
mals, leading Marshall to sell the property a few years later to a real es-
tate investment company. Marshall failed to disclose the anthrax
outbreak during the subsequent sale. Marshall received cash and a non-
recourse note secured by a lien. The real estate investment company then
sold the property to Kusch. When a subsequent anthrax outbreak killed
many animals, Kusch sued Marshall alleging, among other things, that
Marshall had violated the DTPA. The jury found in favor of Kusch on
the DTPA claim.10
Marshall appealed arguing that, as a matter of law, the DTPA could
not apply because Marshall was not a party to Kusch's transaction. The
Dallas Court of Appeals reversed,"l recognizing that while the DTPA
does not require privity, it does require that a deceptive act be committed
in connection with the plaintiff's transaction.12 This connection exists
when a misrepresentation reaches the consumer or when the initial seller
receives a benefit from the subsequent transaction.' 3 Although none of
Marshall's representations reached Kusch, Kusch argued that, because
Marshall had a nonrecourse note with a lien on the property, Marshall
had a benefit from the sale to Kusch. The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that mere possession of a purchase money note and a lien on
property does not give the note holder a connection to the subsequent
sale of the property.14
In Bohis v. Oakes,'5 the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered
when a third-party beneficiary has consumer status. Charles Oakes con-
tracted with a builder for construction of a new home. The builder
6. Id. § 17.45(4); see also Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52
(Tex. 1987).
7. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996); see also
Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650).
8. Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
9. Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet).
10. Id. at 784.
11. Id. at 787.
12. Id. at 786.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 787.
15. Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
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showed Oakes and his wife Michelle a home that the builder had con-
structed for Louis David Bohls. During the tour of the home, Bohls rec-
ognized Michelle as a former employee and offered to provide the
interim financing. The Oakeses agreed, but later, upon being dissatisfied
with the home, sued the builder, Bohls, and Bohls' company for breach of
contract, fraud, and DTPA violations. The jury found in favor of the
Oakeses. 16
On appeal, Bohls contended that the Oakeses were not consumers for
the following reasons: (1) there was no legal relationship or written
agreement between the parties; (2) there was no transfer of goods or ser-
vices founded on "valuable consideration;" (3) there was no evidence of a
purchase or payment for services; and (4) any services that Bohls may
have provided were gratuitous. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that the Oakeses were consumers, 17 finding that "consumer status is es-
tablished merely by seeking to acquire services, even if the services are
not actually acquired, and no money need change hands to establish con-
sumer status."'1 8 Thus, the court held that "it was not necessary for there
to have been a written agreement, an actual purchase, or any considera-
tion paid for Charles to be a consumer. It was enough that [Charles]
sought to acquire Bohls's services in good faith."' 9 Bohls also argued
that Michelle was a not consumer because she was a stranger to the trans-
action. The court rejected this argument holding that a third-party bene-
ficiary can qualify as a consumer if (1) the transaction was specifically
required by, or intended to benefit, the third party, and (2) the good or
service was rendered to benefit the third party.20 The court held that
Michelle was a third-party beneficiary of the transaction between Charles
and Bohls by virtue of her relationship to Charles as well as her intent to
occupy the home after it was built. Thus, the court held that Charles and
Michelle were consumers as a matter of law under the DTPA. 21 The de-
termination of the remaining DTPA elements (i.e., whether Bohls sup-
plied goods or services, whether he committed any unconscionable act,
and the determination of damages) were fact issues to be decided by the
jury.22
The San Antonio Court of Appeals examined the meaning of the
"seeks or acquires" requirement in Nast v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Co.23 The Nasts were homeowners who sued their insurer and insurance
agent. In June 1997, the Nasts became concerned about the possibility of
flooding after a flood damaged their neighbor's home and spoke to their
insurance agent's secretary (who also was a licensed insurance agent)
16. Id. at 476.






23. Nast v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 82 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
no pet.).
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about flood insurance. The secretary told the Nasts that they did not live
in a flood zone that qualified them for insurance through the National
Flood Insurance Program ("FEMA flood insurance"). The Nasts then
spoke with their insurance agent of eighteen years, who confirmed the
secretary's statements, and said that it would be cost prohibitive to obtain
non-FEMA flood insurance. The Nasts asked why their neighbors were
able to get inexpensive flood insurance, and the agent responded that he
had heard of a "shyster" selling flood insurance in the Nasts' neighbor-
hood and that he hoped the neighbors never needed to collect on the
insurance. Based upon the agent's representations that they were ineligi-
ble for FEMA flood insurance and that alternative insurance would be
cost prohibitive, the Nasts did not purchase any flood insurance.
In October 1998, the Nasts' home suffered substantial flood damage.
After the flood, the Nasts discovered that they had, in fact, been eligible
for FEMA flood insurance. The Nasts sued the agent and the insurer for
fraud, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, gross
negligence, and DTPA violations. The defendants moved for summary
judgment alleging, in part, that the Nasts were not consumers because
they did not purchase flood insurance. The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals held that the Nasts were consumers.2 4 The DTPA defines a con-
sumer as an individual who "seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any
goods or services. '2 5 Thus, the court explained that consumer status is
established merely by seeking to acquire services, even if the services are
not actually acquired. 26
In Rayford v. Maselli,27 the Houston Court of Appeals for the First
District considered whether the recipient of free services falls under the
definition of a consumer. In Rayford, a prison inmate sued the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, State Counsel for Offenders ("TDCJ-
SOC") and two of its employees alleging DTPA violations related to al-
leged legal malpractice. The inmate had been receiving legal services
provided gratuitously by the TDCJ-SOC. The trial court dismissed the
case pursuant to section 14.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, which permits dismissal of frivolous actions brought by inmates.28
In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court may
consider, among other things: (1) if the claim has no arguable basis in law
or fact, and (2) if it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of
the claim.29 The inmate appealed, arguing that he was entitled to proceed
with his DTPA claims because he qualified as a consumer. Disagreeing,
the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a gratuitous act is
not a purchased good or service under the DTPA.30 Because the inmate
24. Id. at 122.
25. DTPA § 17.45(4).
26. Nast, 82 S.W.3d at 122.
27. Rayford v. Marsell,73 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
28. Id. at 411.
29. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003 (Vernon 2002)).
30. Id.
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could not demonstrate that he sought or acquired services by purchase or
lease from the defendants, the court concluded as a matter of law that the
inmate was not a consumer within the meaning of the DTPA.31 Thus,
dismissal of the inmate's claim was appropriate as it had no arguable ba-
sis in law or fact.32
A plaintiff that otherwise might qualify as a consumer is precluded
from consumer status if it is a "business consumer that has assets of $25
million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity
with assets of $25 million or more. '33 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit examined this limitation in Hugh Symons
Group, plc v. Motorola, Inc.34 The lawsuit was filed by Concept Technol-
ogies, Ltd., which, at the time of the events giving rise to the suit was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Hugh Symons Group, plc. Subsequent to the
filing, Hugh Symons transferred its shares of Concept Technologies to a
third party and substituted in as plaintiff. Concept Technologies then as-
signed its interest in the suit to Hugh Symons. The defendant moved for
summary judgment maintaining that Hugh Symons lacked consumer sta-
tus because its assets exceeded $25 million. The trial court granted the
motion and Hugh Symons appealed, arguing that, because Concept had
less than $25 million in assets, it was a consumer under the DTPA.35
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, recognizing that when a DTPA plaintiff is
asserting a claim acquired by assignment, the assignor's consumer status
controls. 36 At the time of the alleged DTPA violation and at the time the
suit was filed, the assignor-Concept-was a wholly owned subsidiary of
Hugh Symons. Because Concept was at all relevant times controlled by
another with assets of greater than $25 million, the court held that it was
not a consumer.3
7
III. IDENTIFYING THE PROPER DEFENDANT
During this Survey period, three reported cases examined whether the
proper defendant had been identified by the DTPA plaintiff.
The issue in Kingston v. Helm38 was whether an individual could be
held liable for conduct he undertook while acting as a representative for a
corporation. Kingston sued Helm for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and DTPA violations arising from Kingston's purchase of a townhome
from Greenway Development, Inc. ("GDI"). Kingston alleged that
Helm, who was the president of GDI, personally made false representa-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. DTPA § 17.45(4).
34. Hugh Symons Group, plc v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 123
S. Ct. 386 (2002).
35. Id. at 469.
36. Id. (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctr. Partners Ltd., 41 S.W.3d 270, 279
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. granted)).
37. Id.
38. Kingston v. Helm, 82 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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tions to Kingston regarding the townhome. The case went to trial and the
court entered a directed verdict for Helm at the close of Kingston's case,
holding that the evidence was insufficient to hold Helm liable in his indi-
vidual capacity. 39 Kingston appealed. The Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals reversed,40 holding that Helm could be held individually liable for
his own tortious conduct and that Kingston was not required to pierce the
corporate veil.41 The court rejected Helm's argument that Article 2.21 of
the Texas Business Corporations Act required a contrary result.42 Article
2.21 states, in relevant part:
A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a
subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or any
affiliate thereof or of the corporation, shall be under no obligation to
the corporation or to its obligees with respect to ... any contractual
obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising
from the obligation on the basis that the holder.., is or was the alter
ego of the corporation ... unless the obligee demonstrates that the
holder.., caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of per-
petrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily
for the direct personal benefit of the holder.43
The court held that, by its terms, Article 2.21 was intended to protect a
corporation's shareholders, not its officers or agents.4 4 The court also
held that Article 2.21 applies to suits that attempt to impose individual
liability on a corporate shareholder merely on the basis of shareholder
status, rather than on the basis of the shareholder's own actions.4 5 Fi-
nally, the court held that Article 2.21 was limited to liability arising from
the corporation's contractual obligations.46 While the Bar Committee
notes indicate that the statute should be applied "by analogy to tort obli-
gations," the court declined to extend the coverage of the statute to the
claims before it because the court did not believe that the Legislature
intended Article 2.21 (with its heightened obligations on a plaintiff) to
abrogate the general principle that an agent is always liable for his or her
own tortious conduct. 47
In Jones v. CGU Insurance Co.,48 the issue was whether an insurer
could be held liable to a third party for failing to pay that third party's
claims against the insured. Jones sued a food manufacturer alleging that
she became ill after eating one of the manufacturer's products. She also
sued the manufacturer's insurer, CGU, alleging that CGU told her it
would investigate and process her claim but then refused to pay. Jones
39. Id. at 758.
40. Id. at 757.
41. Id. at 761 (citing Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1985)).
42. Kingston, 82 S.W.3d at 764-66.
43. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r ANN. art. 2.21(A) (Vernon 1980).
44. Kingston, 82 S.W.3d at 765.
45. Id. at 765-66.
46. Id. at 766.
47. ld.
48. Jones v. CGU Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
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had filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs and, in response, CGU filed
a motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 13.001 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tices and Remedies Code. The motion contended that Jones' suit had no
basis in law and therefore was frivolous and malicious. After the trial
court conducted a hearing on the motion and dismissed the lawsuit, Jones
appealed.49 The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under
the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code a third party tort claimant has
no direct cause of action against a defendant's liability insurer.50
The plaintiffs in Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler51 purchased a
manufactured home from a retailer. The plaintiffs contended that the
salesman told them that their home would be free of defects and exactly
like the model home displayed on the lot. The home arrived with numer-
ous defects, most of which were never repaired, and the plaintiffs sued
the manufacturer, retailer, and financer, alleging fraud, breach of con-
tract, and DTPA violations. After a bench trial, the court entered judg-
ment against the defendants. On appeal, the manufacturer and financer
argued that no evidence established the retailer as their agent. Disagree-
ing, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed,52 finding that the record es-
tablished the following: (1) the three defendants were "a vertically
integrated company;" (2) all three defendants were represented by the
salesman and manager on the lot; (3) the retailer provided the warranty
on the installation of the home while the manufacturer provided the war-
ranty for coverage of defects and workmanship; (4) the same employee
completed the repairs for both entities; and (5) the contract between the
plaintiffs and the retailer was immediately assigned to the financer.
Based on these findings, the court held judgment was proper because it
was clear from the evidence that all three defendants participated in the
transaction with the plaintiffs.53
IV. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty, or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred and that such conduct
was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 54
A. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in 26 subparts, a nonexclusive list of
actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts" under the
49. Id. at 628.
50. Id. at 629 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex.1994)).
51. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002,
pet. denied).
52. Id. at 373-74.
53. Id. at 374.
54. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
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statute. Plaintiffs invoking these "laundry list"55 claims are generally not
required to prove or plead the defendant's state of mind or intent to
deceive. 56 Nor have plaintiffs always been required to show that they
relied on the enumerated deceptions. 57 Whether a consumer should have
to show reliance, however, remains the subject of debate.58 Several sig-
nificant cases involving "laundry list" claims were decided during the Sur-
vey period.
In James V. Mazuca and Associates v. Schumann,59 the plaintiff hired a
law firm to represent him in claims arising from an Arizona automobile
accident in which the plaintiff was injured. The law firm filed suit in
Texas against the driver and the driver's insurer. Eventually, nonsuits
were filed against both defendants. The nonsuit against the driver was
without prejudice but contained boilerplate language that "[p]laintiff
does not desire to prosecute this matter further against Defendant(s)."
The claims were not refiled in Texas and by the time they were filed in
Arizona, the statute of limitations had run. Schumann then sued the law
firm for DTPA violations, breach of warranty, negligence, and gross neg-
ligence alleging, among other things, that the boilerplate language in the
nonsuit was an actionable misrepresentation and that the law firm had
nonsuited the insurer without his knowledge. The jury found for Schu-
mann on his negligence and DTPA claims and awarded damages and at-
torneys' fees. Schumann elected to recover under the DTPA and the law
firm appealed.60
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed.61 The
court held that an actionable misrepresentation must be one of material
fact.62 Because the suit could have been refiled the day of the nonsuit,
the wording of the nonsuit had no independent legal effect and thus could
not be material.63 In addition, the words were not a misrepresentation to
Schumann since he was not aware of the statement having been made
and neither took, nor refrained from taking, any action based on the
statement. 64 Finally, filing the nonsuit against the insurer without the cli-
ent's knowledge or consent was not an affirmative deception as required
by the DTPA.65 The court concluded that the law firm made bad deci-
55. The earliest located reported case reference to the enumerated items listed under
DTPA section 17.46(b) as a "laundry list" occurred in Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980). Several subsections do
explicitly involve an element of scienter. See, e.g., DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16),
(17) & (24).
57. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600.
58. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Ass'n, 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.
1995).
59. James V. Mazuca & Assocs. v. Schumann, 82 S.W.3d 90 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).
60. Id. at 93.
61. Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 95-96.
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sions, but not misrepresentations. 66
The plaintiff in Gill v. Boyd Distribution Center67 was an inmate who
purchased five cans of Ensure, a nutritional beverage manufactured by
Ross Products Division, Abbott Laboratories, from a prison commissary
operated by Boyd Distribution Center. The plaintiff alleged that the cans
of Ensure were labeled "Not for Retail Sale for Professional Use Only"
and were nutritionally inferior to other types of Ensure. He further al-
leged that the commissary list gave reasonable indication that the Ensure
was manufactured for retail sale, which induced him to make the
purchase. The plaintiff sued Ross Products and Boyd, alleging that the
misbranding and/or misrepresentation caused him mental anguish, humil-
iation, and embarrassment. The trial court, without a fact-finding hear-
ing, dismissed the petition as frivolous and the plaintiff appealed. 68 The
Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
claims against Ross Products. 69 The only wrongful conduct the plaintiff
alleged against Ross Products was the introduction or delivery of prod-
ucts into commerce that were not manufactured for resale. The court
held that this behavior was not a statement of fact and thus could not be
the basis for a DTPA claim. 70 The court reversed the dismissal of the
plaintiff's claims against Boyd.71 The plaintiff alleged that Boyd made a
false or misleading statement by listing the Ensure on the commissary list,
which gave the plaintiff a reasonable indication that it was the type and
quality of Ensure manufactured for the purpose of retail sale. The plain-
tiff further alleged that Boyd knew that the containers were marked "not
for retail sale" and that the quality of the product was different than that
produced for retail sale. Although the court recognized that inquiry into
the factual basis of the plaintiff's claim against Boyd might reveal that the
claim was, in fact, frivolous, the court held that the plaintiff's allegations
were not indisputably meritless, irrational, or wholly incredible, and thus
were improperly dismissed.72
1. § 17.46(b)(5)-Misrepresentation
To maintain an action for misrepresentation under DTPA section
17.46(b)(5), a consumer must show that the defendant represented "that
goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he does
not."7
3
66. Id. at 96.
67. Gill v. Boyd Distrib. Ctr., 64 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet.
denied).
68. Id. at 603.
69. Id. at 605.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 605-06.
73. DTPA § 17.46(b)(5).
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Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc.7 4 arose from an automobile acci-
dent in which a seven-year-old boy was severely injured while riding in
the front passenger seat of a Ford Aspire. His parents sued Ford Motor
Company and the dealership where they purchased the car claiming: (1)
the passenger air bag enhanced their son's injuries; (2) the defendants
misrepresented the Aspire's safety characteristics; and (3) the defendants
failed to warn them of the possible risks to a child riding in the front
passenger seat. The trial court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the Chandlers' DTPA claims and the Chandlers appealed. 75
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed, 76 holding that the Chandlers'
misrepresentation claim under section 17.46(b)(5) required that they in-
troduce evidence demonstrating that the alleged misrepresentations were
false or misleading.77 The summary judgment evidence demonstrated
that the car salesman had told Mr. Chandler that the Ford Aspire had
dual air bags and that, in the salesman's opinion, if the Chandlers were
going to buy a small car, the Ford Aspire would be safer for children than
the Geo Metro, which the Chandlers were also considering, because of
the passenger side air bag. The Chandlers did not introduce any evidence
that the salesman's statements were false or misleading. Instead, Ford
introduced unrebutted evidence that a vehicle with two air bags is safer
than a vehicle with one air bag. The court also observed that the sales-
man's statements were qualified-that the Aspire was a safer car if the
Chandlers were buying a small car-and that the statements were "sales
talk" or "puffing," which are not actionable under the DTPA.78 The
Chandlers also alleged that Ford and the car dealership engaged in decep-
tive advertising. The Chandlers supported this claim with an advertise-
ment for a Ford Taurus showing a child riding in the front seat. The
Eastland Court of Appeals held that the advertisement was too vague to
support a DTPA misrepresentation claim.79
2. § 17.46(b)(24)-Failure to Disclose
Section 17.46(b)(24) is perhaps the broadest "laundry list" provision, as
it permits a consumer to premise a DTPA claim on the allegation that the
defendant failed to disclose information to the consumer prior to con-
summation of the transaction. To maintain an action for failure to dis-
close under this section, a consumer must show that the defendant failed
to disclose information concerning goods or services that was known at
the time of the transaction and that the nondisclosure was motivated by
an intent to induce a transaction into which the consumer otherwise
74. Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no
pet.).
75. Id. at 498.
76. Id. at 501-04.
77. Id. at 501.
78. Id. (citing Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar, 794 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990), writ denied, 800 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)).
79. Id. (citing Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 886 (Tex. 1999)).
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would not have entered. 80
As discussed above, Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc. 81 arose from
an accident in which a child was injured while riding in the front passen-
ger seat of a Ford Aspire. His parents sued Ford Motor Company and
the dealership where they purchased the car, claiming that the defendants
violated section 14.46(b)(24) by failing to warn of the possible risks from
a deploying air bag to a child riding in the front passenger seat.82 The
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the Chan-
dlers appealed. 83
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed, 84 holding that a plaintiff
claiming nondisclosure under the DTPA was required to prove four ele-
ments: "(1) a failure to disclose information concerning goods or services;
(2) which was known at the time of the transaction; (3) if such failure was
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction; (4) into which the
consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed. '85
Thus, nondisclosure is actionable only if the defendant had knowledge of
the undisclosed information and intentionally withheld that informa-
tion.86 The only evidence of the defendants' knowledge was a 1972 mem-
orandum stating that there was a risk of serious injury from deploying
airbags to children under twelve years old or under five feet tall. The
court of appeals held that the memorandum was not evidence that Ford
knew of the alleged danger from the 1994 Aspire's air bag to a seven-
year-old boy, because there was no evidence that the 1972 air bag was the
same as or similar to the air bag in the 1994 Aspire. 87 Because the Chan-
dlers had not introduced evidence that Ford intentionally withheld infor-
mation regarding the danger to a child from the Aspire's air bag, the
court of appeals held that summary judgment was appropriate on the
Chandlers' section 17.46(b)(24) claim. 88
3. Section 17.50-Breach of Express or Implied Warranties
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties. 89
To be actionable under the DTPA, an implied warranty must be recog-
nized by common law or created by statute. 90 The Austin Court of Ap-
80. DTPA § 17.46(b)(24); see also Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. 1995).
81. Chander, 81 S.W.3d at 493.
82. At the time the Chandlers filed suit, section 17.46(b)(24) was numbered
17.46(b)(23). Chandler, 81 S.W.3d at 502 n.1.
83. Id. at 498.
84. Id. at 501-04.




89. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); see DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
90. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes,
Tex., 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
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peals examined this issue in Raymond v. Rahme.91 In that case, the
concrete subcontractor on a construction project attempted to file and
sue on a mechanic's and materialman's lien against the property. The
property owner counterclaimed alleging that the subcontractor had
breached his contract with the contractor as well as express and implied
warranties, so as to give rise to both common law claims and DTPA viola-
tions. After a bench trial, the court rendered a take nothing judgment for
the subcontractor and awarded the property owner damages on his
counterclaims. 92
The subcontractor appealed, and the Austin Court of Appeals reversed
and rendered. 93 The court found that the subcontractor had given a two-
year express warranty against major cracking. But there was no evidence
in the record that the concrete had suffered "major cracking" and no evi-
dence that any such cracking occurred during the two-year warranty pe-
riod. 94 The court also held that a property owner cannot recover under
an implied warranty theory from a subcontractor with whom the owner
has no direct contractual relationship.95 Because the DTPA does not cre-
ate a warranty, there was no evidence of a breach of an express warranty,
and there was no evidence of an actionable implied warranty, the trial
court erred in entering judgment for the property owner.96
In Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc.,97 discussed above, parents of a
child injured by an air bag sued Ford Motor Company and the dealership
where they purchased the car alleging breaches of implied warranties.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the
Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed.98 The court held that there was no
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because a plaintiff rais-
ing such a claim has the burden of proving that the goods were defective
at the time they left the manufacturer's or seller's possession. 99 To prove
that the goods are defective, the plaintiff must show that the goods are
not fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used.100 Because the
Chandlers' car provided transportation, the court held that it was fit for
its ordinary purpose.101 And because the car's air bag restrained passen-
gers by deploying upon a frontal or near frontal impact, it too was fit for
its ordinary purpose.' 0 2 The court of appeals held that "[a] product which
performs its ordinary function adequately does not breach the implied
warranty of merchantability merely because it does not function as the
91. Raymond v. Rahme, 78 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
92. Id. at 555.
93. Id. at 563-64.
94. Id. at 562-63.
95. Id. at 563 (citing Codner v. Arellano, 40 S.W.3d 666, 672-74 (Tex. App.-Austin
2001, no pet.)).
96. Id. at 563.
97. Chandler, 81 S.W.3d at 493.
98. Id. at 498, 501-04.
99. Id. at 502.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 503.
102. Id.
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buyer would prefer."' 0 3
The court of appeals also held that the Chandlers had presented no
evidence of a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular,
non-ordinary purpose, applicable when the seller has some reason to
know that the buyer requires the goods for a particular purpose and is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods.104 Summary judgment was appropriate on that claim because
there was no evidence that the Chandlers purchased their car for a pur-
pose other than transportation and no evidence that the Chandlers pur-
chased the air bag as part of the car for some purpose other than as part
of the restraint system.'0 5
In Nast v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,10 6 discussed previously,
homeowners sued their insurer and insurance agent alleging fraud,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, gross negli-
gence and DTPA violations because the agent erroneously told the home-
owners that they were not eligible to purchase FEMA flood insurance.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached an implied warranty
by failing to furnish insurance services in a good and workmanlike man-
ner. Summary judgment was granted for the defendant because there is
no breach of an implied warranty for failing to furnish insurance services.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed,10 7 noting that the Texas
Supreme Court has recognized an implied warranty for services only
when the services relate to the repair or modification of existing tangible
goods or services or when, due to a compelling need, public policy man-
dates such a warranty.' 08 The court held that under the Texas Insurance
Code, an insured normally has recourse against a carrier for unfair prac-
tices; therefore, there is no compelling need for an implied warranty for
failing to furnish insurance services in a good and workmanlike
manner.
109
B. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE
TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Numerous statutes incorporate various sections of the DTPA or permit
recovery for their violation via the DTPA." 0 One of the most frequently
103. Id. (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Brewer, 966 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1998)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Nast, 82 S.W.3d at 114.
107. Id. at 123.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Statutes either incorporating provisions of the DTPA or permitting recovery for
their violation via the DTPA include: TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 351.604, 702.403 (Vernon
2003); TEX. PROP. COOE ANN. §§ 41.007 (Vernon 2000), 59.005, 221.024, 221.071, 222.011
(Vernon 1995); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.74(c) (Vernon 2002); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.013 (Vernon 2001); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon
1981 & Supp. 2003); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2003),
5221a-7 (Vernon 1987, Supp. 2003), 5221a-8 (Vernon 2003), 5221f (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
2003), 9020 (Vernon 2003); and TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 684.086 (Vernon 1999).
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invoked "borrowing" statutes is Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance
Code." 1
In Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas v. Boyte,112 the Texas Su-
preme Court considered whether an insurer's common law and statutory
duties of good faith and fair dealing extend beyond entry of judgment in
favor of the insured. Boyte sustained injuries to his back in a car acci-
dent. He settled with the other driver's insurer for the limit of the
driver's policy and then filed an underinsured motorist ("UIM") claim
with his insurance carrier, Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas. A
jury found that Boyte was entitled to his entire remaining policy benefits.
While Mid-Century's subsequent appeal was pending, Boyte informed
Mid-Century that he was in urgent need of back surgery but could not
afford to pay for it. Mid-Century offered to pay for the surgery and post-
surgery therapy but refused to pay the full judgment while its appeal was
pending. Boyte never scheduled the surgery. The court of appeals af-
firmed the UIM judgment. The Texas Supreme Court denied review and
Mid-Century paid the judgment. Boyte then filed a new suit against Mid-
Century for, among other things, common law bad faith and violations of
Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, alleging that Mid-Century knowingly
failed to attempt a fair settlement when its liability became reasonably
clear after the UIM judgment. Boyte also alleged that the two-plus year
delay in payment had injured him. The trial court granted Mid-Century a
directed verdict on Boyte's claims arising before or during the UIM trial,
and the parties stipulated that Boyte was seeking damages only for Mid-
Century's post-judgment conduct. 113 The jury found in Boyte's favor,
and the trial court rendered judgment against Mid-Century. The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Mid-Century's duty of
good faith and fair dealing extended beyond the UIM judgment.114
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Boyte
take nothing.11 5 The court held that once the trial court's judgment was
entered the parties became judgment debtor and judgment creditor, re-
spectively.116 Because the concerns of disparity in bargaining power that
give rise to an insurer's duty of good faith do not exist in the judgment
creditor-judgment debtor context, Mid-Century's duty of good faith and
fair dealing was extinguished upon entry of judgment.1 7 As the statutory
standard for good faith is identical to the common law standard, Boyte's
statutory claims received identical treatment.118
111. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2003).
112. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Boyte, 80 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2002).
113. Id. at 547.
114. Id. at 547-48.
115. Id. at 547.
116. Id. at 548.
117. Id. The court rejected Boyte's argument that Mid-Century's ability to supercede
the judgment was relevant to the analysis. Id.
118. Id.
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In Wright's v. Red River Federal Credit Union,1 9 the Texarkana Court
of Appeals held that not every claim of misrepresentation under the In-
surance Code is also a DTPA claim. In that case, an automobile repair
shop sued an insurance company, a credit union, and a vehicle's owner to
recover the cost of repairing the vehicle. Although the plaintiff did not
allege a DTPA violation against the credit union, the credit union moved
for summary judgment on claims of negligent misrepresentation and
DTPA violations but made no mention of the plaintiff's claims of breach
of contract, fraud, or violation of the Insurance Code. The trial court
nevertheless granted summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims
against the credit union. On appeal, the court of appeals recognized that
Article 21.21, section 16(a) of the Insurance Code incorporated part of
the DTPA.120 However, the plaintiff had specifically sued the credit
union for violation of section (4)(1) of Article 21.21 and thus had not
alleged a DTPA violation at all. 121
The Texas Insurance Code expressly requires that a plaintiff alleging a
DTPA claim under the Insurance Code demonstrate that he or she relied
on an insurance agent's deceptive act or practice. 122 The defendants in
Nast v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,123 discussed above, moved for
summary judgment alleging that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs did not
rely on the agent's misrepresentations. The defendants alleged that be-
cause the plaintiffs knew that their neighbors had obtained FEMA flood
insurance, they should have known that the insurance agent was wrong
when he said that the plaintiffs were ineligible for such insurance.
The plaintiffs offered evidence that, while they were aware that some
of their neighbors had FEMA flood insurance, they did not believe that
they were entitled to obtain it because their agent (whom they had
known for 18 years) told them that they were not eligible. The agent
further told the plaintiffs that they should beware of anyone quoting low
rates to persons in their neighborhood. The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals held that this evidence created a fact issue concerning whether the
plaintiffs relied on the agent's misrepresentations. 124
V. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages. 125 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant acted "knowingly,"
the plaintiff also may recover damages for mental anguish and additional
statutory damages up to three times the amount of economic damages.
126
119. Wright's v. Red River Fed. Credit Union, 71 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.).
120. Id. at 918.
121. Id. at 918-19.
122. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2003).
123. Nast, 82 S.W.3d at 114.
124. Id. at 121.
125. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
126. Id.
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The plaintiff in Guzman v. Ugly Duckling Car Sales of Texas, L.L.P.127
purchased a used car from the defendant under a contract providing that
the defendant did not waive any remedies it might have in the event of a
future default merely by deciding not to use its remedies for every de-
fault. The plaintiff made several late car payments and made other pay-
ments for less than the full amount due. Eventually, the defendant
repossessed the car and sold it at auction. The plaintiff sued, claiming
that the defendant violated the DTPA by making false and misleading
statements regarding the acceptance of her late payments and the possi-
bility of the car being repossessed. The defendant counterclaimed against
the plaintiff for breach of contract. In response to the counterclaim, the
plaintiff asserted waiver as an affirmative defense. The jury found that
the defendant had committed a DTPA violation and that the plaintiff had
breached her contract with the defendant but awarded no damages to
either party.128 The plaintiff appealed, claiming that it was against the
great weight of the evidence for the jury to find that she suffered no dam-
ages. The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.129 In determining the
proper amount of damages, the jury was asked to consider: (1) the rea-
sonable and necessary expense incurred in renting a car after the repos-
session; (2) the amount of equity the plaintiff had in the vehicle; and (3)
past and future mental anguish. The evidence at trial indicated the fol-
lowing: (1) the plaintiff rented a car "a couple of times ... to do stuff on
the weekend;" (2) at the time of the repossession the plaintiff owed more
than the car was worth; and (3) while the plaintiff was "depressed and
sidetracked" and suffered from declining performance at work as a result
of losing her car, she did not lose her job and never sought any counseling
or treatment. In viewing the evidence as a whole, the court held that the
jury's finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages was not
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.' 30
The plaintiff in Cooper v. Lyon Financial Services, Inc.131 was a cos-
metic surgeon who purchased a laser based in part upon the representa-
tions of a sales representative that with the laser there would be no
discoloration, no pain, and no need for reoperation and that the surgeon
could return the laser if he was dissatisfied. After the surgeon received
the laser, the salesman provided a one-day, in-service training session
during which the surgeon used the laser on two of his patients. The sur-
geon had not previously used a laser, did not take advantage of any other
free training, and did not read the manual before the surgery. The sur-
geon testified that there was no problem with the laser from a functioning
standpoint, but his patients were not satisfied with the surgery and he
127. Guzman v. Ugly Duckling Car Sales of Tex., L.L.P., 63 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
128. Id. at 525.
129. Id. at 526-27.
130. Id. at 527.
131. Cooper v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.).
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never used the laser again. The surgeon called the salesman twice about
returning the laser but failed to comply with the contractual requirement
of rejecting the laser in writing. He could not recall whether he rejected
the laser within the contractual 30-day limit.
The surgeon stopped making payments on the laser and the finance
company repossessed it and sold it to another medical practice. The com-
pany then sued the surgeon for breach of contract seeking the amount
still due on the lease and attorneys' fees. The surgeon counterclaimed
and sued the laser's manufacturer. The jury found in favor of the finance
company on its breach of contract claim and awarded damages. The jury
found in favor of the surgeon on his DTPA claims against the finance
company and manufacturer, but awarded no damages.
The surgeon appealed, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the jury's decision not to award him damages.1 32
His appeal rested entirely on his testimony that the laser had no value to
him. The Houston Court of Appeals held that the surgeon's testimony
was not evidence of the value of the laser because a property owner can
only testify about the market value of his property and not the intrinsic,
personal, or other measure of value. 133 The surgeon admitted that the
laser was not defective in any way, that it did what the literature said it
would do, and that he had no complaints about its working according to
specifications. The court found that the testimony constituted more than
a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's implicit finding that the value
of the laser the surgeon received equaled or exceeded the purchase
price. 134 The only evidence weighing against the jury's finding of no dam-
ages was the surgeon's subjective testimony that the laser did not fulfill
representations that it would produce no pain, no discoloration, and no
need for reoperation. Evidence also existed, however, that the surgeon
was unable to properly use the laser because he did not obtain the recom-
mended training and thus his expectations were unreasonable. The court
held that "the jury's finding [was] not so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong and unjust."'135
VI. DTPA DEFENSES AND EXEMPTIONS
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent.136 This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 137 Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that common law defenses, such as estoppel and
132. Id. at 202.
133. Id. at 204.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
137. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17) & (24).
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ratification, are not available to combat DTPA claims.138 Other courts
have recognized a variety of defenses to DTPA claims.139 Additionally,
both the courts and the legislature have carved out exemptions from the
DTPA's reach.
A. THE DTPA's EXCLUSION FOR MOST PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
The 1995 amendments to the DTPA limited the ability of a plaintiff to
bring a DTPA claim arising from professional services. 140 Section
17.49(c) provides that "[nlothing in this subchapter shall apply to a claim
for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence
of which is the providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar profes-
sional skill." The exemption does not apply "to an express misrepresen-
tation of a material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment
or opinion."'1 41
As discussed above, the plaintiff in James V. Mazuca and Associates v.
Schumann142 hired a Texas law firm to represent him in claims arising
from an Arizona automobile accident in which the plaintiff was injured.
The law firm filed suit but the claims were nonsuited; meanwhile the
Texas statute of limitations lapsed. Local counsel in Arizona attempted
to pursue litigation in that state, but the claims were ultimately dismissed
as barred by the Arizona statute of limitations. Schumann then sued the
Texas law firm alleging breach of the DTPA. The jury found for Schu-
mann and the law firm appealed. 143
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed.1 44 The court recognized
that under Texas law an allegation that an attorney was negligent will not
give rise to a DTPA claim. But a DTPA claim can arise from an allega-
tion that an attorney engaged in an unconscionable course of action.145
The court held that, while the law firm was clearly negligent, its actions in
nonsuiting the case without prejudice prior to the running of the statute
of limitations did not constitute unconscionable conduct. 146 Similarly, the
law firm's mistaken belief, based upon consultation with Arizona counsel,
138. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998); see also Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA
was to relieve consumers of common law defenses while providing a cause of action for
misrepresentation).
139. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Machs., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be
barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, No. 05-94-01673-CV (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication), 1995 WL 500308, at *10
(applying illegality/public policy affirmative defense to DTPA claims); Keriotis v.
Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e)
(applying statute of frauds to DTPA claims).
140. Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 4, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2991.
141. DTPA § 17.49(c)(1).
142. Schumann, 82 S.W.3d at 90.
143. Id. at 93.
144. Id. at 96.
145. Id. at 94.
146. Id.
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that an Arizona savings provision would extend the Arizona statute of
limitations constituted negligence, but was not evidence of deceptive
conduct.147
The defendants in Nast v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,148 dis-
cussed above, also moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
insurance agent's erroneous statements-that the plaintiffs were not eligi-
ble to purchase FEMA flood insurance and that a "shyster" was selling
flood insurance in their neighborhood-constituted professional advice/
opinion. The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed, 149 holding that
the plaintiffs eligibility for FEMA flood insurance and a shyster going
around the plaintiffs' neighborhood selling flood insurance were facts and
not advice or opinions.150
B. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
Certain statutory schemes and common law doctrines expressly or im-
pliedly bar DTPA claims and may affect a plaintiff's procedures for bring-
ing DTPA claims. During the Survey period, several cases examined such
limitations on the DTPA's reach.
1. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")
regulates the content and format for labeling herbicides and requires that
all herbicides be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency.
151
FIFRA preempts common law tort suits based solely upon claims relating
to labeling. 152 The plaintiffs in American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye' 53
treated part of their peanut crop with a mixture of the herbicides manu-
factured by American Cyanamid. The plaintiffs claimed that they relied
on various labels and advertisements specifically stating that the two her-
bicides could be "tank mixed." Additionally, they claimed to have relied
on advertisements stating that one of the herbicides was a good choice for
crop safety and did not cause injury to peanut plants. The plaintiffs as-
serted that the herbicide mix harmed their peanut plants and resulted in a
reduction in yield. The plaintiffs sued American Cyanamid alleging
breach of express and implied warranties, strict liability, and DTPA viola-
tions. American Cyanamid filed a motion for summary judgment, assert-
ing that FIFRA preempted the claims. The trial court agreed and
dismissed the claims.' 54 The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
147. Id. at 95.
148. Nast, 82 S.W.3d at 114.
149. Id. at 122.
150. Id.
151. Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. 1995).
152. Id.
153. American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, 79 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002).
154. Id. at 23.
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ing that FIFRA did not preempt the plaintiffs' claim.155 The Texas Su-
preme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the plaintiffs'
claims related directly or indirectly to the statement on the product label
claiming that the herbicides could be combined by tank mixing. 156 The
Texas Supreme Court noted that the Environmental Protection Agency
did not require herbicide manufacturers seeking labeling approval to sub-
mit data regarding either the efficacy or the toxic effect of the herbicide
on desirable plants.157 Because the EPA had not evaluated whether the
tank-mixed herbicide combination used by plaintiffs had a toxic effect on
peanut plants, and thus neither evaluated nor regulated the American
Cyanamid labels (claiming that the combination was safe to use on pea-
nut plants), the Texas Supreme Court held that FIFRA did not preempt
the plaintiffs' claims. 158
The plaintiff in Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. Bates159 was an herbicide
manufacturer who received numerous demand letters from peanut farm-
ers contending that one of the plaintiff's herbicides was "highly toxic"
and failed to control weeds. Further it was alleged that the plaintiff mis-
represented the product. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that
FIFRA preempted the farmers' claims. Regarding the farmers'
threatened DTPA claims, the plaintiff argued that the claims were, in es-
sence, claims of misrepresentation through advertising and that such
claims are challenges to the herbicide's label. The farmers responded
that their claims also arose from the representations made by the plain-
tiff's retail distributors who instructed the farmers about the herbicide's
uses and extolled the herbicide's excellent results. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock Division held that
the farmers offered no evidence that the distributors' remarks were dif-
ferent from the information on the herbicide's label.1 60 Because claims
premised on off-label remarks are preempted when they merely repeat
the information on the label, the court held that FIFRA preempted those
claims.' 61
The farmers also complained that, after the herbicide allegedly dam-
aged the peanut crops, the plaintiff's employees misrepresented that the
peanut crops would recover and that the plaintiff would pay for any pro-
duction loss and increased expenses. The court held that these represen-
tations did not repeat any information on the herbicide's label and thus
were not preempted. 62
155. Geye v. American Cyanamid Co., 32 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000),
affd, 79 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002).
156. American Cyanamid, 79 S.W.3d at 23.
157. Id. at 25.
158. Id. at 26-27, 29.
159. Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. Bates, 205 F. Supp. 2d 623 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
160. Id. at 627.
161. Id. (citing Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 400 (5th Cir. 1999)).
162. Id. at 627-28.
20031 D TPA 1501
SMU LAW REVIEW
2. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code
The Texas Legislature enacted the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission
Code 163 to govern the distribution and sale of motor vehicles through
licensing and regulating vehicle manufacturers, distributors, and deal-
ers.164 The Code provides that the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission
("TMVC") shall carry out the duties and functions conferred upon it by
the Code. If the TMVC determines that the Code, or any TMVC rule or
order, has been violated, it may levy a civil penalty, issue cease and desist
orders or injunctions, or institute a lawsuit in the name of the State of
Texas; but it may not award damages to parties.165
The 2000 and 2001 DTPA Surveys reported on the case of David Mc-
David Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc.,166 in which the Dallas
Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court examined the relation-
ship between the Code and the DTPA. McDavid, an automobile dealer-
ship, sued Subaru alleging that Subaru orally consented to the
dealership's relocation and then refused to allow the relocation. McDa-
vid terminated its Subaru dealership agreement and sued under various
theories including theories based upon the Code and the DTPA.
In an opinion issued in May 2001, the Texas Supreme Court held that
the Code conferred primary, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over McDa-
vid's DTPA claims to the TMVC. 167 About the time that opinion was
issued, the Texas Legislature amended the Code to provide that the
TMVC "has the exclusive, original jurisdiction to regulate those aspects
of the distribution, sale, and leasing of motor vehicles as governed by"
the Code. 168 The Texas Supreme Court then granted Subaru's motion for
rehearing to determine which version of the Code applied and whether
the applicable provision granted primary or exclusive jurisdiction to the
TMVC.169
The Texas Supreme Court first held that the 2001 amendments to the
Code applied retroactively and that the Code, as amended, vests the
TMVC with exclusive jurisdiction. 70 The court then held that McDavid
was required to exhaust its administrative remedies and obtain final
TMVC findings to support its DTPA claim.' 7' If the Board's findings
163. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 441.3(36) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2003).
164. Subaru of American, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 224 (Tex.
2002).
165. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.01-.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp.
2003); see also Kawasaki Motors Corp. v. Tex. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 855 S.W.2d 792, 798
(Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
166. David McDavid Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002).
167. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 779, 2001
WL 578337 (May 31, 2001), superseded on rehearing by 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002).
168. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 3.01(a) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2003).
169. Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 219.
170. Id. at 223.
171. Id. at 225. The Texas Supreme Court rejected McDavid's argument that this would
violate its open courts rights as to its DTPA claims because those claims arise from a stat-
ute and not the common law. Id. at 227.
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were favorable, McDavid could maintain its DTPA action in the trial
court. 172 The Code requires the trial court to "pay due deference" to the
TMVC's findings. 173 The Texas Supreme Court interpreted this provision
to mean that the trial court cannot retry the TMVC's findings and "must
treat them as entirely binding."'1 74 The impediment to the trial court's
jurisdiction would be removed once McDavid exhausted its administra-
tive remedies by obtaining findings from the TMVC on the issues covered
by the Code. The Texas Supreme Court thus held that the trial court
should not dismiss McDavid's claims requiring such findings, but should
abate the claims to allow McDavid a reasonable opportunity to cure the
jurisdictional problem. 175
3. The Texas Workers' Compensation Act
In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Fodge,176 the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether a person seeking workers' compensation
could, without a prior determination from the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission that the benefits are due, prosecute a lawsuit against a
carrier to recover benefits and damages resulting from the denial of bene-
fits. The plaintiff claimed compensation for a back injury she suffered at
work. The carrier denied coverage. The Commission determined that
the plaintiff had suffered a compensable back injury and ordered pay-
ment of temporary income benefits, which the carrier made. The plaintiff
had neither claimed medical benefits nor complained that the carrier had
denied medical benefits. The plaintiff then sued the carrier for mishan-
dling her claim thereby seeking damages for workers' compensation due,
mental anguish resulting from her inability to obtain medical care, past
and future lost wages, impairment of credit reputation, statutory dam-
ages, and attorneys' fees. The carrier interposed a plea to the jurisdiction
and motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff's claims were based on a
denial of compensation benefits that only the Commission has jurisdic-
tion to award and that the plaintiff had never complained to the Commis-
sion for additional benefits and thus had failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. The trial court dismissed the case and the plain-
tiff appealed. 177 The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that all of the plaintiff's extracontractual claims were unrelated to any
claim for compensation benefits and thus were properly before the trial
court. 17
8
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals. 179 The court read the plaintiff's petition as making three claims:
172. Id.
173. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4413(36), § 6.06(a) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2003).
174. Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 225.
175. Id. at 228.
176. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2001).
177. Id. at 803.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 805.
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one for compensation benefits, another for damages caused by the bad
faith denial of those benefits, and a third for damages caused by the delay
in handling the claim and paying the benefits that were determined to be
due. The court held that, because only the Commission can determine a
claimant's entitlement to compensation benefits, it follows that allowing a
court to award damages for wrongful deprivation of benefits would cir-
cumvent the Commission's jurisdiction.1 80 Thus, courts cannot award
damages for a denial of compensation benefits without a determination
by the Commission that the benefits were due) 81 With respect to the
plaintiff's first two claims, therefore, the claims were properly dis-
missed.182 Because her third claim related to benefits that the Commis-
sion had awarded, however, the claim was ripe for adjudication and
should not have been dismissed. 83
C. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Smith v. Elliott 84 involves the application of the statute of frauds in an
action against a physician for misrepresentation. The plaintiff consulted
the defendant physician about breast reduction surgery. The physician
assured her that the results would be favorable, that her breasts would
"look good," and that she would be pleased with the results. He also said
that any scarring would be a "fine line." The plaintiff had the surgery but
was not pleased with the results as her breasts were different sizes and
she had very noticeable scarring. The patient plaintiff sued the physician
under various theories including misrepresentation under the DTPA.
The trial court entered judgment for the physician on his affirmative de-
fense of statute of frauds and the plaintiff appealed. 185 The El Paso
Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the Texas Supreme Court's opinion
in Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 86 which "note[d] the possible application of the
statute of frauds" to claims of physician misrepresentation. The court
held that a DTPA claim fails where a defendant physician in a DTPA case
raises the affirmative defense of statute of frauds and the plaintiff fails to
prove a writing signed by the physician that contains the representation
or promise relied upon. 87 The court held that such a requirement was
particularly apt since the plaintiff had signed a consent form that ex-
pressly warned of the risk of scars.
D. "As Is" CLAUSES
An "as is" agreement generally negates the causation element of a
180. Id. at 804.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 805.
184. Smith v. Elliott, 68 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
185. Id. at 846.
186. Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 243 n.5 (Tex. 1994).
187. Smith, 68 S.W.3d at 847.
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DTPA claim.188 The plaintiffs in Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Cabler189 entered into a contract to purchase a manufactured home that
disclaimed enforceability of oral statements. The plaintiffs contended
that the salesman told them that their manufactured home would be ex-
actly like the model home on the lot and that all defects would be fixed.
The home arrived with numerous defects, most of which were never re-
paired, and the plaintiffs sued alleging claims of fraud, breach of contract
and DTPA violations. The trial court entered judgment against the de-
fendants. On appeal, the defendants argued that the disclaimer of en-
forceability of oral statements acted like an "as is" clause barring the
plaintiffs' claims.
The El Paso Court of Appeals first acknowledged that to determine the
effect of an "as is" clause, a court must consider the nature of the transac-
tion and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the agreement. 190
The court held that the plaintiffs were not bound by the disclaimers be-
cause the plaintiffs were unsophisticated, the disclaimers were boilerplate
provisions and the plaintiffs testified that they had relied upon the sales-
man's representations in deciding to enter into the agreement. 19 1
E. CAUSATION
Liability under the DTPA is limited to conduct that is a producing
cause of the plaintiff's damages. 192 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
cause, producing cause does not require that the injury be foreseeable. 193
"Producing cause" has been defined as "an efficient, exciting, or contrib-
uting cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages
complained of."'1 94 When determining whether the actions complained of
are the producing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether
the alleged cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's
injury, without which the injury would not have occurred. 195
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals applied the concept of producing
cause in Palmer v. Espey Huston & Associates, Inc.,196 which arose from
the development of a marina in the Laguna Madre at Port Isabel, Texas.
The development included construction of an artificial breakwater that in
subsequent storms failed to protect docks and boats inside the marina.
The developer then sued the architectural firm that worked on the plan-
ning and design phase of the project, the engineering firm that studied the
188. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.
1995).
189. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d at 363.
190. Id. at 371.
191. Id. at 372 (distinguishing Prudential Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d at 156).
192. Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 478.
193. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
194. Union Pump Co. v. Albritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
195. Prudential Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d at 161.
196. Palmer v. Epsey Huston & Assocs., Inc., 84 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, no pet.).
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types of waves that could be expected (as well as how four different types
of breakwaters would react to those waves), and the civil engineer that
designed the final breakwater. The developer alleged that the defendants
had misrepresented their ability to design the breakwater as well as mis-
represented that the breakwater was constructed in a good and workman-
like manner. Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendants, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that, where
none of the defendants had constructed or supervised the construction of
the breakwater, any misrepresentations regarding the construction could
not be the producing cause of the developer's damages.' 97 The court also
held that the evidence did not establish that the alleged misrepresenta-
tions regarding the defendants' ability to design the breakwater were the
producing cause of the developer's damages. 98
Wellisch v. United Services Automobile Assoc. 199 arose from an auto-
mobile accident in which the Wellisches' daughter was killed. The Wel-
lisches sued the driver's estate and settled. The Wellisches then sought to
recover under their own uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with
USAA. USAA denied the claim, and the Wellisches sued raising both
contractual and extracontractual claims. The contractual claims were
tried to a jury, which found in favor of the Wellisches. USAA immedi-
ately paid the policy limits. The trial court then considered the Wel-
lisches' claims under the Insurance Code and DTPA, which were
premised on the Wellisches' assertion that, because no reasonable investi-
gation into the claim took place, their claim was unreasonably denied.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of USAA.200
On appeal, the Wellisches did not challenge the summary judgment in
favor of USAA on economic damages; instead, they challenged the sum-
mary judgment on only their mental anguish damages.20 1 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while the Wellisches
presented evidence of their mental anguish, they had failed to present
evidence that the mental anguish stemmed from USAA's failure to prop-
erly investigate their claim (as opposed to the actual denial of their
claim). The court thus held that the Wellisches did not raise a fact issue
sufficient to defeat USAA's entitlement to summary judgment on their
mental anguish claim. 20 2
197. Id. at 355.
198. Id.; see also Schumann, 82 S.W.3d at 95 (holding that a law firm's use in a nonsuit
without prejudice of boilerplate language that the plaintiff did not intend to pursue his
claims was not a producing cause of damages since the client did not rely on the language
and the language was not a pivotal factor in the client's subsequent inability to pursue the
nonsuited claims); see discussion supra notes 59-66, 142-47 and accompanying text.
199. Wellisch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 75 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).
200. Id. at 56.
201. Id. at 59.
202. Id. at 60.
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The plaintiff in Gourrier v. Joe Myers Motors, Inc.20 3 purchased a used
automobile and extended warranty from Myers and drove the car for sev-
eral years. When the car began leaking engine oil, another dealer refused
to repair it under the warranty because the car was beyond the mileage
limit. Rather than paying to have the car repaired, Gourrier drove it until
it became inoperable. He then stopped making monthly payments and
the car was repossessed. Gourrier sued Myers complaining of errors in
the documentation of his car purchase, alleging that Myers violated the
DTPA by misrepresenting its ability to legally sell the vehicle and by
breaching an implied warranty of title. Myers moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that there was no evidence that any of these acts
were the producing cause of any damages. The trial court granted Myers'
motion and the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed. 20 4 Gourrier had not
discovered the alleged problems with the purchase paperwork until after
he stopped using the vehicle. The court held that summary judgment was
appropriate given Gourrier's failure to produce evidence that any alleged
violations or misrepresentations caused him damage.205
In Golden v. McNeal,206 a convicted felon attempted to bring malprac-
tice and DTPA claims against his court appointed attorney and investiga-
tor. Golden had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance
and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. His conviction was upheld
on direct appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his peti-
tion for discretionary review, and the United States Supreme Court de-
nied his petition for writ of certiorari. Golden then sued his attorney and
investigator, complaining in a 344-page petition of numerous deficiencies
that he perceived in the conduct of the investigation, trial, and appeal of
his case. The investigator moved for summary judgment alleging, among
other things, that Golden's criminal behavior was the sole proximate
cause of his conviction. The trial court granted the motion and the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District affirmed.207
The court recognized that in Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,208 the Texas
Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, a criminal defendant's own
conduct was the sole proximate cause of her indictment and conviction,
thus barring the criminal defendant's malpractice and DTPA claims
against her attorney.209 The court held that the rationale of Peeler should
be extended to malpractice and DTPA claims brought against an investi-
gator aiding a criminal defense attorney or a pro se criminal defendant. 210
203. Gourrier v. Joe Myers Motors, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.), withdrawn and superseded by, No. 14-00-01665-CV, 2002 WL
31971745 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 8, 2002, no pet.).
204. Id. at 658.
205. Id.
206. Golden v. McNeal, 78 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied).
207. Id. at 491-92.
208. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995).
209. Golden, 78 S.W.3d at 491-92.
210. Id. at 492.
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The court concluded that Golden's own criminal conduct was the sole
proximate cause of any malpractice, negligence, or DTPA damages flow-
ing from his conviction and, thus, summary judgment on those claims was
appropriate.21'
In Nast v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 21 2 discussed above, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had been damaged because their homeowner's
insurance agent erroneously told them that they were not eligible to
purchase FEMA flood insurance. The defendants moved for summary
judgment maintaining that the plaintiffs had been damaged by their own
failure to purchase flood insurance, rather than by the agent's misrepre-
sentations. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that there was a gen-
uine issue of material fact regarding the cause of the plaintiffs'
damages. 213 Both plaintiffs testified in their depositions that they trusted
their insurance agent and did not make further attempts to purchase
flood insurance because they believed him. The court held that summary
judgment was inappropriate because there was evidence that the plain-
tiffs did not purchase FEMA flood insurance because they relied upon
the agent's misrepresentation.21 4
F. LIMITATIONS
Under the DTPA's limitations provision, an action must be com-
menced within two years after the date on which the false, misleading or
deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the consumer
discovered, or should have discovered, the occurrence of the false, mis-
leading or deceptive act or practice.215
In LaGloria Oil and Gas Co. v. Carboline Co.,216 a refinery owner/
operator sued the manufacturer of fireproofing material that had been
applied to certain structural steel, vessels, vessel skirts and pipe racks at
the refinery alleging that the fireproofing material had caused corrosion.
The defendants pled the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense
and LaGloria responded by pleading the discovery rule. At trial, the jury
was asked over LaGloria's objection whether LaGloria "discovered, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered ... the exis-
tence of corrosion that was occurring under . . . [the] fireproofing. ' '217
The jury answered in the affirmative. 218
The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,219 holding that a
jury issue on the discovery rule must inquire when the plaintiff "discov-
211. Id.
212. Nast, 82 S.W.3d at 114.
213. Id. at 122-23.
214. Id.
215. DTPA § 17.565.
216. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co. v. Carboline Co., 84 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001,
pet. denied).
217. Id. at 232.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 243.
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ered, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have dis-
covered, the 'nature of the injury' as that term has been defined by the
Texas Supreme Court. '220 The court recognized that the Texas Supreme
Court's definition has changed slightly over time but held that the current
definition of "nature of the injury" covers both the injury itself and the
fact that the injury was "'likely caused by the wrongful acts of
another.' "221
The case of Ehrig v. Germania Farm Mutual Insurance Association222
arose from an insurance company's denial of coverage under a home-
owner's insurance policy. The homeowners sued their insurer alleging vi-
olations of the DTPA. The insurer moved for summary judgment on
limitations grounds, arguing that limitations had been triggered on the
date its adjuster informed the homeowners orally that their claim was
denied. The Ehrigs argued that limitations was not triggered until they
received the subsequent, written notice of the denial. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer but the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals reversed.22 3 The court held that limitations on causes
of action stemming from the denial of insurance coverage begin to run
when the claim is denied outright.22 4 The court held that the question of
whether the oral denial constituted an "outright denial" sufficient to trig-
ger limitations was a question of fact for the jury to determine.22 5
The plaintiff in Knott v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co.,226
was a physician who sued an insurer and its agent alleging that they had
misled him regarding the terms of two disability insurance policies. The
plaintiff sustained a fracture to his spine in 1985. He was unable to work
for two months and, although he returned to his practice, he was never
able to do some procedures again. He initially applied for total disability
benefits under the policies in 1985, but the claim was denied. The plain-
tiff did not contest that denial. In 1996, he filed a second claim for total
disability benefits. The insurer paid the benefits for 24 months and then
terminated payment. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the termination
of benefits constituted bad faith and breach of the insurance contract and
that the insurance agent had misrepresented the terms of the policies.
The agent moved for summary judgment alleging, in part, that the claims
were barred by limitations. The trial court granted the motion and the
Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed.22 7 The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that his cause of action did not accrue until his benefits were
terminated in 1998. The plaintiff claimed that he had been continuously
220. Id. at 236.
221. Id. at 234-36 (quoting Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998)).
222. Ehrig v. Germania Farm Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 84 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, pet. denied).
223. Id. at 322.
224. Id. at 324.
225. Id. at 325.
226. Knott v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 70 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2002, pet. granted).
227. Id. at 932-33.
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disabled since the accident in 1985. The court stated that if the plaintiff's
claims of misrepresentation were correct, the initial denial of benefits was
improper.228 The court found that, because of that initial denial of bene-
fits, the plaintiff was authorized at that time to seek a judicial remedy and
the statute of limitation had long since expired. 229
An insurance policy holder sued its insurer and insurance broker for
negligence and DTPA violations in Al-Tex Roofing, Inc. v. Greenwood
Insurance Group, Inc.,230 claiming they placed its insurance with an insol-
vent insurer. The insured had contacted the insurer in late 1995 to
purchase $2 million of general liability insurance. The insurer wrote a
policy for $1 million and asked the agent to procure another $1 million of
coverage. The agent procured the $1 million policy from Resure, Inc. In
March 1997, the agent learned that Resure was insolvent and notified the
insurer. The insurer then notified the insured that the policy would be
cancelled effective March 27, 1997. In March 1999, judgment was entered
against the insured on a personal injury suit.
The insured then sued the agent and insurer who moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by limitations. The
trial court granted the motion and the insured appealed. 23' On appeal,
the insurer asserted that the insured suffered damage authorizing a judi-
cial remedy in March 1997, either when it learned of Resure's insolvency
or when the Resure policy was cancelled. The defendants claimed that
these events caused three distinct injuries: (1) the loss of liability cover-
age, (2) the loss of pre-paid premiums, and (3) the loss of coverage under
the policy for defense costs for the personal injury lawsuit. The Houston
Court of Appeals for the First District held that the loss of coverage did
not authorize the insured to seek a remedy before the day it suffered a
judgment in the personal injury suit because, until that day, the insured
had not made a claim for indemnity and nobody had denied such a
claim. 232 The court held that while the loss of the pre-paid premiums
might have started limitations running under other circumstances, it did
not do so here because the evidence showed that the premiums were re-
funded.233 Finally, the court held that the record did not show that the
insured ever claimed or was denied coverage for its defense costs in the
personal injury suit.234 Because the defendants did not show as a matter
of law that the claims were barred by limitations, summary judgment was
inappropriate. 235
228. Id. at 932.
229. Id. at 932-33.
230. All-Tex Roofing, Inc. v. Greenwood Ins. Group, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
231. Id. at 414.
232. Id. at 415.
233. Id. at 416.
234. Id. at 416-17.
235. Id. at 417.
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VII. AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES TO DEFENDANT
Section 17.50(c) of the DTPA provides that a defendant is entitled to
recover its attorneys' fees incurred in defending against a DTPA claim if
the claim is "groundless and brought in bad faith, or for purposes of har-
assment." Under section 17.50(c), "groundless" means a claim having no
basis in law or fact, and not warranted by any good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.236 In determining
whether a claim is groundless, a court should determine "whether the
totality of the tendered evidence demonstrates an arguable basis in fact
and law for the consumer's claim."' 237 A suit is brought in bad faith if it is
motivated by a malicious or discriminatory purpose.238 Whether a suit is
groundless or brought in bad faith is a question of law.239
The San Antonio Court of Appeals examined this provision in two
cases decided during the Survey period. In Bohis v. Oakes,240 Charles
Oakes contracted with a builder for the construction of a new home and
accepted Bohls' offer to provide the interim financing. Charles and his
wife were dissatisfied with the home and sued the builder, Bohls and
Bohls' company, Bohls Equipment Company. The claims against Bohls
Equipment Company were nonsuited prior to trial. After trial on the
Oakeses claims against Bohls (individually) and the builder, the trial
court awarded Bohls Equipment $9,000 in attorneys' fees, finding the suit
against the company groundless.241 The Oakeses appealed, contending
that the trial court erred in awarding the attorneys' fees to Bohls Equip-
ment because there was no hearing on the motion for sanctions and no
"good cause" stated in the order.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the trial
itself constituted the hearing and the trial court's judgment stated the suit
was "groundless. ' 242 The court held that limitations had run by the time
the Oakeses added Bohls Equipment to the suit and that, except for a few
invoices issued on Bohls Equipment letterhead, there was virtually no
evidence that the company was involved in the transaction. The court
thus held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding at-
torneys' fees to Bohls Equipment. 243
In Davila v. World Car Five Star,244 a woman sued World Car for
breach of contract, conversion and DTPA violations claiming that World
Car repossessed a car she had lawfully purchased. World Car counter-
claimed alleging fraud and breach of contract and seeking its attorneys'
236. Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989).
237. Splettstosser v. Myer, 779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1989).
238. Cent. Tex. Hardware, Inc. v. First City, Tex.-Bryan, N.A., 810 S.W.2d 234, 237
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
239. Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 637.
240. Bohls, 75 S.W.3d at 473.
241. Id. at 476.
242. Id. at 480.
243. Id.
244. Davila v. World Car Five Star, 75 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no
pet.).
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fees under section 17.50 of the DTPA. By the time the case was called to
trial, a combination of summary judgment rulings and pre-trial directed
verdicts had left the plaintiff with no claims, and the only remaining issue
was World Car's counterclaims. The trial court entered a directed verdict
in favor of World Car. World Car then presented its claim for attorneys'
fees and asked that they be assessed jointly and severally against the
plaintiff and her attorney, which the trial court subsequently did. The
attorney filed a motion for new trial on the issue of his liability for attor-
neys' fees. The trial court ordered World Car's attorney to file a motion
for sanctions and stated that it was abating the ruling on attorneys' fees
and would hold a "full-blown" hearing on the motion. World Car filed its
motion; the trial court held a hearing and took the matter under advise-
ment. Weeks later, the parties appeared before the court upon the attor-
ney's request that an order be entered. Despite the court's earlier
statement abating the attorneys' fees ruling, the trial court stated that the
only issue it took under advisement was the amount of attorneys' fees.
Rather than ruling on World Car's motion, the trial judge then upheld its
original judgment.245
The attorney appealed arguing that he had been denied a meaningful
hearing.2 46 The attorney maintained that the trial court had erred in lim-
iting its evaluation to only the evidence presented during the course of
the litigation and refusing to consider evidence relating to the attorneys'
motives and credibility or to the information available to the attorney.2 47
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that to de-
termine whether a suit is groundless under the DTPA, a trial court must
consider "the totality of the tendered evidence to determine whether
there is an arguable basis in fact or law for the consumer's claim. '2 48 The
trial court must examine the facts available to the litigant, the circum-
stances existing when the litigant's pleadings were filed, and the credibil-
ity and motives of the person signing the pleadings. 249 Because the
attorney attempted to introduce evidence relevant to this inquiry and the
trial court refused to consider it, the court of appeals held that the trial




Continuing a trend perceived over the last several Surveys, this year's
crop of cases was dominated by disputes involving financial and profes-
sional services and real estate. Over half of the 30 reported decisions
selected for discussion either involved insurance (eight cases), profes-
245. Id. at 541.
246. Id. at 543.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 543-44 (citing Splettstosser, 779 S.W.2d at 808).




sional services (five cases), or real estate (five cases). Of the remaining
cases, four involved motor vehicles, two involved herbicides, and the re-
maining cases involved sundry other services and goods. Aside from au-
tomobiles, few cases involved traditional consumer products.
This year's cases broke little new substantive legal ground. Continuing
another trend seen in previous years, several cases focused on the parties'
respective relationships to the transaction in issue (Marshall, Bohls, Oak-
wood, Homes, Kingston, Gill, Raymond). Another area that received sig-
nificant attention was causation (Palmer, Wellisch, Gourrier, Golden,
Nast). These decisions suggest that, in the absence of explicit privity or
forseeability requirements, the courts continue to struggle with the task
of placing appropriate limits on the DTPA's reach. Similar tensions are
reflected in the cases testing the relationship between the Insurance Code
and the DTPA (Jones, Nast, Mid-Century, Wrights, Wellisch, Ehrig, Knott,
All-Tex Roofing) and cases involving efforts to base DTPA claims on al-
leged implied warranties (Raymond, Chandler, Nast).
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